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GROUP AND OTHER LEGAL SERVICES
FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS
I. IN SEARCH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Discussions of group legal services invariably commence or con-
clude with an attempt to relate the supposed advantages of the
group approach to the public interest. Such an approach has much
to commend it, and indeed is inevitable if one accepts service to oth-
ers as a necessary criterion of the legal profession. But the "public
interest" is an elusive concept, available to justify various, and at
times opposing, activities.'
The most prolific use of the phrase "public interest" occurs in
discussions of the emerging area of law practice dedicated to repre-
sentation of the poor and advocacy of broad policy considerations
in the areas of consumer protection and environmental problems.
2
But even in this arena, there is a lack of agreement as to which ac-
tivities are truly in the public interest. It has been suggested, for
example, that "the allocation of public interest law resources to
majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns (i.e. the environmental
1. Were not both parties in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
utilizing a public interest argument to advance their positions?
2. See, e.g., Charles R. Halpern and John M. Cunningham, Reflections
On The New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for
Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095 (1971).
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issue) is contrary to the public interest."3
Also there is the traditional concept of public interest work,
termed "pro bono publico," generally shortened to "pro bono," and
meaning "for the public good." Usually "pro bono" describes work
for which the attorney charges no fee or a fee at a lower rate than he
generally receives. 4 "Pro bono" may also be used to designate es-
sentially social activities unconnected with the practice of law. Ex-
amples of activities described as "pro bono" by respondents in a re-
cent study include umpiring Little League baseball and serving on
boards of various associations and school districts.5
Inextricably bound up with the concept of "pro bono" work by
traditional firms is the assumption that the judicial system will pro-
duce a just result if both sides have vigorous advocates. Thus the
role of the profession is essentially neutral in the view of the tradi-
tional concept. The lawyer simply advocates one side and the sys-
tem decides questions of right or wrong, with the "public interest"
emerging as the end result.6 Indeed this view of the lawyer's role
is not only urged upon students commencing their legal studies 7 but
the duty of vigorous advocacy has been codified in Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.8
Several conclusions suggest themselves from a survey of activi-
ties and philosophies purporting to further the public interest. The
first is that what constitutes the "public interest" is largely a mat-
ter of self-definition, although certain identifiable characteristics of
public interest law firms do emerge. Marks, for example, suggests
that one "external definition" of public interest activity must encom-
pass ". . . broad policy or investigative approaches designed to iden-
tify social injury or particular abuses in advance of or in coopera-
tion with individual or group identification of these wrongs."D But
despite the utility of such definition, the danger that "public inter-
est" rhetoric may needlessly alienate the private bar and contrib-
ute to the abdication of public duty to the "public interest" firms,10
militates against focusing undue attention upon the phrase itself.
3. Cahn and Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970).
4. F. RAYMOND MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 7 (1972).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 9.
7. See, e.g., LOUISELL AND HAzARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, 39
(2d ed. 1968).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY, CANON 7, "A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously within the Bounds of the Law."
9. MiRs, supra note 4, at 50.
10. Hegland, Beyond Enthusiam and Commitment, 13 AIZ. L. REV. 805
(1971).
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It also appears that the "public interest" law firms which formu-
late broad policy prior to the selection of clients1 have failed to
contribute fully to the functioning of the adversary system. The
assumption that the public interest lawyers serve "interests"'
1
seems counter to a premise of the adversary system: that the
law serves individuals. 3 This is not to say that the public interest
law movement is not performing a valuable service by representing
heretoforeslighted or ignored special interests.' 4 The danger comes
if we assume that this movement is the only legitimate voice of the
public interest. If the adversary system is but a tool of our plural-
istic society, then individual clients in need of services, or in need
of protection from the majority, must obtain access as well.
The third conclusion is that the assumption that the adversary
system is capable of advancing the public interest is deeply rooted
in legal thinking and generates surprisingly little opposition.1 5 This
assumption does much to explain the fact that the bar associations'
efforts in the public interest area are aimed at improving the qual-
ity of the system as it is and not at restructuring the system.16
But however important it is to maintain the high quality of serv-
ices actually performed, the fact remains that the adversary system
works only for those who have access to it. As Brandeis pointed
out, if the system is to produce balanced public-policy decisions, all
interests must be represented in the process.'7 Thus the question
of whether or not the causes which presently use the system repre-
sent the "public interest" becomes almost irrelevant. The proper
inquiry would seem to be whether there are legitimate interests
which are precluded from gaining access.
11. MLA.Rxs, supra note 4, at 229-236.
12. Id. at 151-185.
13. Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 805
(1971).
14. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) where the
Supreme Court recognizes that litigation may well be the sole practicable
avenue open to minority interests to petition for redress of grievances.
15. But see Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J.
1069 (1970) suggesting that it may be desirable to define the public inter-
est apart from the essentially pluralistic concept which underlies the ad-
versary system.
16. See, e.g., Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Pro-
fession in Fulfilling its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available", 48 TEX.
L. REV. 285 (1970).
17. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248
(1918) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
II. NEEDS OF MIDDLE INCOME PEOPLE
Before addressing the question of whether or not middle income
people need more legal services than they are presently getting,
it is appropriate to offer a definition of "middle income." No pre-
cise definition is possible, nor, it is submitted, is it necessary. The
term, of course, is relative and any attempt at fixing minimum and
maximum income levels would be arbitrary without some know-
ledge of the community to which the inquiry was addressed. A sug-
gested criterion, however, would be to include those persons whose
income is at such a level to disqualify them for free legal aid. The
upper limit presents a tougher problem. To define it as simply that
level of income at which people regularly utilize the services of an
attorney begs the question. The best that can be done therefore is to
suggest a monetary figure of $15,00018 and trust to the sense of the
reader a feel for more precise limits.
It is often asserted that the question of whether or not middle
income people need more legal services than they are presently get-
ting has never been satisfactorily answered. As early as 1964, the
California State Bar Committee on Group Legal Services urged that
a comprehensive study be conducted to determine the needs of mid-
dle income people for legal services. 19 No such study has been
forthcoming. Professor Stolz in his epic study of the feasibility of
legal insurance points out that:
There is no direct evidence that the middle class needs more le-
gal service than it is presently getting. Citations can be collected
stating that there is a need, but the sources cite each other, not
broad, careful empirical research. 20
There are indeed proposals, including those by the ABA Special
Committee on Availability of Legal Services,2 1 which state that
there is an unfulfilled need for legal services in the middle class.
What is perhaps the most definitive study of means for satisfying
the needs of middle income people flatly asserts that such needs do
exist.22 This is august company, and a serious challenge of the as-
sumption that middle class people do have unfulfilled needs for
18. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS, SOME
PROBLEMS OF AVAILIBILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, 5 (1970).
19. California State Bar Committee on Group Legal Services, "1964 Prog-
ress Report", 39 J. ST. BAR CAL. 639, 721 (1964).
20. Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasi-
bility, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 417, 419 (1968).
21. Preliminary Handbook on Prepaid Legal Services, Papers and Docu-
ments Assembled by Special Committee of Prepaid Legal Services, Ameri-
can Bar Association-September, 1971, 25 (hereinafter cited as Prepaid
Legal Handbook).
22. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 18, at 229.
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legal services would be of questionable validity. It might be in or-
-der, however, to examine briefly what empirical data is available,
and some parallel experiences.
In January, 1971 California Teachers Association cooperated with
the American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation in
conducting a survey of Los Angeles area teachers. Approximately
50% of the 5000 questionnaires were returned, with 77% of those in-
dicating an interest in participating in a prepaid legal plan.23 Al-
though this response in itself suggests a perceived need for legal
services on the part of the respondents, of immediate interest is the
disparity between the frequency of the occurrence of legal problems
and the retention of an attorney. For example 25.1% of the respond-
ents indicated that they had experienced a consumer problem in
the past 5 years and 35% anticipated that future problems in this
area were either possible or certain. Yet 3.5% had contacted an
attorney and only 1.1% had retained his services.
24
The Shreveport Bar Association's program of prepaid legal serv-
ices to the 600 member Laborers Local 229 adds further support
to the assumption that there are unfulfilled needs for legal services
among the middle class. Demand for lawyer services prior to the
instigation of the program was quite close to the "national annual
need" of 10%. Demand for services by those participating in the
plan had increased to 20% at the end of the first year, with a dis-
cernible trend toward 30%.25 In view of the findings prior to the
instigation of the program that a majority of middle income people
felt that they would not get their money's worth from a visit to an
attorney,26 this increased usage indicates a direct relationship be-
tween utilization of legal services and elimination of the fear that le-
gal services are available only at a prohibitive cost.
The assumption that there are unfulfilled needs for legal services
in the middle class gains the most support from an analogy
23. Prepaid Legal Handbook, supra note 21, at 48.
24. Id. at 257. Admittedly nothing more than the faintest suggestion of
unfulfilled needs can be culled from this example in the absence of in-
formation as to the monetary value of the problem and an analysis of
whether or not the perceived problems were in fact ones which the legal
system could effectively address.
25. ABA Revised Handbook of Prepaid Legal Services, 265 (1972) (here-
inafter cited as Revised Handbook).
26. Id. at 254.
from the OEO Legal Services Program. It also started on "a foun-
dation of assumed need for legal services by the poor, an assumption
that its sponsors justified by redefining need .... ,'27 That the as-
sumption was correct, however, is not to be denied. Half a mil-
lion cases were handled by OEO Legal Services units in 1968,28 and
it has been asserted that "[i] f all the lawyers in the country worked
full time, they could not deal with even the articulated legal prob-
lems of the poor.
' '29
How far one can generalize from the OEO Legal Services experi-
ence is not readily apparent. Demand by the poor for free legal
services does not necessarily suggest commensurate demand by
middle income people in a market situation. The Shreveport experi-
ence does suggest, however, that demand for legal services has cer-
tain elasticity, and given this elasticity, it has been suggested that
four factors affect the demand for lawyers' services: "(1) The
quality of services ... (2) the cost to the client ... (3) the acces-
sibility of the service, and (4) public knowledge and attitudes
about law, lawyers, and lawyers' services.13 0  With the avail-
ability of alternative solutions an additional factor.31
Two of these factors have also been recognized by the ABA Spe-
cial Committee on Availability of Legal Services. It has stated that
actual or anticipated cost of legal services together with a sense
of unequal bargaining status with the attorney is a "significant
barrier to wider utilization of legal services" by middle income peo-
ple,3 2 duplicating factors (2) and (4) above.
It would seem reasonable to conclude, then, that money, or lack
thereof, directly affects the frequency of utilization of the legal sys-
tem. Although this conclusion in itself contributes nothing to
our present knowledge, it does, in turn, raise the question of whether
we are prepared to measure the validity of potential input to the
legal system in terms of dollars alone, as the present system has
been assumed to do. In view of a basic premise of traditional legal
theory that the adversary system can produce results consonant
with the public interest, it would follow that economic barriers to
utilization of the system, which preclude the system from weighing
27. Stolz, supra note 20, at 418.
28. Johnson, The OEO Legal Services Program, 14 CATH. L. REv. 99, 100
(1968).
29. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053
(1970).
30. CmusTENsmq, supra note 18, at 23.
31. Id.
32. Prepaid Legal Handbook, supra note 21, at 26.
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a large block of interests during the decision making process,
make it difficult to equate the public interest with the actual prod-
uct of the adversary system.
III. PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
Before examining the present restrictions on group legal serv-
ices, it must first be understood that the term "group legal services"
is not confined to those activities currently allowed under Canon 2
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The term as used
means simply providing legal services to individual members of a
group by a lawyer or lawyers selected by the group to serve the
individual legal needs of its members.3 3 Prepaid open panel plans
developed by the ABA thus do not come under this definition for
the purposes of the discussion, although such plans do recognize the
necessity of dealing with homogenous groups.34
The primary restriction on group legal services is the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility DR2-103 (D) which reads in part:
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that
recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use
of his services or those of his partners or associates. However,
he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal service activ-
ities of any of the following, provided that his independent profes-
sional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without inter-
ference or control by any organization or other person:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes,
or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only
in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretations at the time of the rendition of the services requires
the allowance of such legal service activities, and only if the follow-
ing conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretations, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services
to its members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary
purposes of such organization.
33. Stolz, supra note 20, at 420 n.16.
34. Prepaid Legal Handbook, supra note 21, at 31. Because of the organ-
ized bar's long and continued endorsement of essentially closed panel pro-
grams by the OEO Legal Services Program for people who do not have the
means to pay, the sceptic might be forgiven some doubt as to its motive
or insisting on "free choice of attorney" in situations where the client
can pay something; especially if this insistence is a factor in denying work-
able programs.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from
the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not the organization, is recognized as the client of
the lawyer in that matter.
Against the background of this Disciplinary Rule, the second fac-
tor which affects the use of legal services by middle income peo-
ple becomes more comprehensible. It has been asserted that fail-
ure to recognize legal problems prevents more frequent use of the
legal system.3s This general failure to recognize legal problems
was placed in stark relief by the market study conducted in Shreve-
port prior to the commencement of the prepaid legal services plan.80
The group as a whole went to a lawyer only as a last resort, and
then only about "the most known and settled legal matters." The
law was generally not used preventively and many regarded the
lawyer as unhelpful in situations which clearly called for a legal
remedy.
37
Failure to contact a lawyer even after a legal problem was rec-
ognized also occurred frequently. Of the group surveyed, sixty
per cent felt that lawyers generally could not be trusted, and fifty
per cent said that it was hard to find a lawyer when one was needed.
The manner in which a lawyer was selected was informal and ir-
rational, with fifty-two percent reporting that a friend or family
was the most important channel of communication concerning selec-
tion of a lawyer.38 The experience of taking a problem to a lawyer
did not have a significant effect on these attitudes.39 More im-
portantly, unsatisfactory experience with a lawyer did not gener-
ally lead to changing lawyers, suggesting again that selecting a law-
yer is a major obstacle to utilization of legal services.
40
Thus it appears that large segments of the public are ignorant of
their need for legal services. Further, people generally consider
it hard to find a competent lawyer when needed. Since these prob-
lems would logically seem to exist largely because of ethical re-
strictions on advertising and solicitation 41 and confinement of the
35. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBmTY, EC 2-2, reads in part:
"The legal profession should assist laymen to recognize legal problems
because such problems may not be self-revealing and often are not timely
noticed. . . .°
36. Revised Handbook, supra note 25, at 219.
37. Id. at 256-257.
38. Id. at 222-224.
-39. Cf. The Missouri Bar Survey summarized in 38 J. ST. BAR CAL. 395
(1963) suggesting that personal experience with a lawyer leads to a higher
opinion of one's own lawyer but a lower opinion of lawyers in general.
40. Revised Handbook, supra note 25, at 254-255.
41. Stolz, supra note 20, at 420.
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use of intermediary arrangements to those allowed under DR2-
103 (D), it is appropriate to re-examine these restrictions.
Present day ethical restrictions on advertising and solicitation
find their origins in the common law misdemeanors of mainten-
ance, champerty and barratry. Maintenance was officious inter-
meddling in a suit by maintaining or assisting another in its prose-
cution.42 Champerty was a bargain by a volunteer with a party
to a law suit which gave the champertor a share of the award in
exchange for his paying the expenses of the suit.43 Barratry was
the practice of exciting and stirring up suits, and required at least
three instances of maintenance for conviction.44
Although the influence of the common law misdemeanors yet
remains,45 the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes
in broad, sweeping language that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Le-
gal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Avail-
able.' 46 Furthermore, advising another to take legal action may be
proper if "motivated by a desire to protect one . . . who is ignor-
ant of his legal rights . . ." but improper if "motivated by a desire
to obtain personal benefit . . . or cause litigation to be brought
namely to harass or injure another."47 Thus it would seem that
the profession at last has heeded Max Radin's plea made 37 years
ago:
We must ... discard ... the assumption of Medieval Society,
that a law suit is an evil in itself. It is hard to see how either the
legal profession or our court machinery can justify its existence, if
we go on the assumption that it is always better to suffer a wrong
than to redress it by litigation .... 48
In view of the sweeping recognition of a duty to "make legal coun-
sel available," the rationale for the stifling restrictions on group le-
gal plans contained in DR2-103 (D) must be found in the fear that
use of intermediary arrangements will weaken the lawyer's inde-
pendence of judgment and undermine the attorney-client rela-
42. R. PERKmNs, CRm=NAL LAw 522 (2d ed. 1969).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 523.
45. ABA CODE or PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-9.
46. Id. CANON 2.
47. Id. EC 2-3.
48. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALI.. L. REV. 48, 72 (1935).
tionship.49 There can be no doubt that such professional values
are of inestimable benefit to the public. Indeed, the very concept of
the adversary system is based on the assumption that the advocates
will both vigorously advance the arguments most beneficial to their
clients. The attorney's independence of judgment and his loyalty
to his client will therefore be regarded as values to be preserved
by restrictions on group legal services.
The ban on solicitation and advertising would not logically seem
to serve this end. Henry S. Drinker observed that solicitation
and advertising are different from the other activities restricted by
ethical rules, characterizing the bans on these two activities as
rules of professional "etiquette" rather than "ethics."1'5 It is also
interesting to note that the rules against solicitation and advertising
have little effect upon that segment of the profession serving the
needs of the wealthy and business clients, because such clients
may now be solicited in Martindale-Hubbell and other law lists by
attorneys "who want to tout themselves to potential clients.' '51
The final factor to be considered in regard to solicitation and
advertising is the impact of the Supreme Court decisions on the
constitutional ramifications. National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People v. Button52 held that active solicitation
of civil rights clients by paid staff attorneys was an associational
right protected by the first amendment. Thoughts that the decision
was restricted to purely political activities were dispelled by
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,53 where a union so-
licitation scheme that resulted in channeling most of the union
members' personal injury claims to lawyers picked by the union was
upheld on similar grounds. Subsequently, in United Mine Workers
v. Illinois State Bar Association54 and United Transportation Union
v. State Bar of Michigan55 the Court upheld plans involving rep-
resentation of workers by an attorney employed by the union and
an arrangement with attorneys to handle personal injury cases of
union members for 25% of recovery, respectively. Fee splitting was
said not to be involved in any of the four cases.
49. Nahstoll, Limitations On Group Legal Services Arrangements Under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103(D) (5): Stale Wine In
New Bottles, 48 TEx. L. REv. 334, 339 (1970).
50. H. DRuER, LEGAL ETrcs, 211 (1953).
51. Freedman, Solicitation of Clients by Public Interest Lawyers, 2-3
(1971).
52. 371 U.S. 415, 420 (1963).
53. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
54. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
55. 401U.S. 576 (1971).
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Whether the Court has gone as far as it is going to go in this area
is not known, although in defining the limits of DR2-103 (D) (5) as
those decreed by the Supreme Court, the ABA has apparently
hoped that it has. However, in view of the fact that solicitation of
clients, at least in the factual contexts presented, is constitution-
ally protected activity and the statement "that only a compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's con-
stitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms," 56 such an assumption seems unwarranted. 57 For if, as
has been asserted, the restrictions on solicitation and advertising
do not protect the independent judgment of the attorney or pre-
serve the attorney-client relationship, then Christensen's observa-
tion that the rules are being used to preserve present patterns of
competitive advantage within the profession 58 takes on added sig-
nificance. Is protecting the economic interests of the bar really a
"compelling state interest?"
It must be recognized, however, that other evils are sought to be
prescribed by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibilities' ban
on advertising and solicitation. EC 2-9 states in part that advertis-
ing would:
[E]ncourage extravagant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seek-
ing business and thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore, it
would inevitably produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases
and bring about distrust of the law and lawyers. Thus, public confi-
dence in our legal system would be impaired by such advertise-
ments of professional services. The attorney-client relationship is
personal and unique and should not be established as the result of
pressures and deceptions. History has demonstrated that public
confidence in the legal system is best preserved by strict, self-im-
posed controls over, rather than by unlimited, advertising.
This evil was considered by the Washington, D.C. Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievance in the first signifi-
cant extension of the Supreme Court decisions on advertising and
56. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 416, 438 (1963).
57. See also United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401
U.S. 576, 585 (1971) where the Court says ". . . the principle here in-
volved cannot be limited to the facts of this case.... The common thread
running through our decisions in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, Trainmen, and
United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain mean-
ingful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of
the First Amendment."
58. CHRisTENsFN, supra note 18, at 148-50.
solicitation. The Stern Community Law Firm, then under the di-
rection of Monroe Freedman, is funded through the Lincoln Temple
of the United Church of Christ and the Stern Family Fund. Con-
cerned that people who wished to adopt children were being turned
away by the adoption agencies for arbitrary reasons, the firm ran
an advertisement in local newspapers and radio stations and in
two national magazines advising persons who wished to adopt chil-
dren but had been rejected by the adoption agencies for enumer-
ated reasons to contact the Firm for free legal assistance. A sec-
ond advertisement published by the Firm listed the names of toys
found by FDA to be hazardous, expressed the opinion that pur-
chasers of such toys were entitled to return them for a refund, and
advised the purchasers to contact the Firm if assistance were
needed.59
Rejecting the invitation to scrap the rules against advertising,
the Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievance of the Bar Associa-
tion of the District of Columbia did find that the advertisements
in question were praiseworthy, and "in keeping with the high-
est responsibilities of the legal profession."100 The decision was
predicated upon the assurance that once the attorney-client rela-
tionship was established, neither the church nor the attorney would
attempt to control the case inconsistently with the best interests of
the client."' Further limitations prohibited the use of individual
attorneys' names in the advertisements and required that state-
ments as to the legality of existing practices be asserted as the
opinions of the Firm rather than as categorical facts.
02
The ruling is significant not only because it is apparently the
first approval of advertising addressed to the general public since
the New Deal era's witness of formal approval of advertising by
Liberty League lawyers seeking clients opposed to the establish-
ment of the National Labor Relations Board,63 but also because
the Committee recognized that the good judgment and discretion
of the attorneys were an adequate protection against the overreach-
ing prescribed by EC 2-9. Such good judgment and discretion,
coupled with the existing laws of fraud and the existence of civil
liability for any failure of an attorney to perform as promised,
59. Memorandum on Solicitation Submitted to the Legal Ethics and
Grievance Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Association by the
Stern Community Law Firm.
60. In the matter of Advertising Conducted by Monroe H. Freedman and
the Stern Community Law Firm, Report of the Committee on Legal Ethics
and Grievance of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, 1 (1971).
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 3.
63. ABA COMM. ON PRorEssioNAL ETmIcs, OPINIONS, No. 148 (1935).
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would seem to offer adequate protection to the public from frivo-
lous or exaggerated advertising by attorneys offering group legal
services as well. Indeed, a contrary conclusion "impugns the ba-
sic integrity of the entire (legal) profession."
64
IV. BENEFITS OF GROUP LEGAL SERvIcEs
Prepaid legal services have primarily been urged as a form of in-
surance protection against little injustices and frequently occur-
ring legal costs; its utility arising from its use as a budgeting de-
vice, and as a means of prepaying legal costs.6 5 The theory seems
to be that people will make more frequent use of legal services
if they are allowed to pay for them in advance. This theory would
seem to fly in the face of reality, for how can people be persuaded
to pay in advance for legal services which they now do not even
use? Thus, if group legal services are to become a useful tool, a
critical look must be taken at the present fee structure by those
offering prepaid or group legal services, both as it actually func-
tions and, perhaps more importantly, as the public perceives it.
In other words, if middle income people are to be induced to make
greater use of legal services, the realities of the market place must
be considered. 66
That cost of legal services may be directly regulated by the group
device has been most dramatically demonstrated by the Supreme
Court decisions in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan 7 and United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion 66  In the former, the union limited contingent fees to 25%,
and the latter involved services to union members by a salaried
attorney employed by the union.
It is submitted that such regulation of fees is a desirable result
without adverse effects on the quality of the services. One benefit
64. CHmsTENSEx, supra note 18, at 141-42.
65. Stolz, supra note 20, at 425; Prepaid Legal Handbook, supra note 20,
at 25-32.
66. This is perhaps the most valuable contribution of Barlow Christensen
in Lawyers for People of Moderate Means (1970). While not advocatingccommercialization" of the profession, he is among the few who have rec-
ognized that the competitive market place is a major factor to be consid-
ered when discussing the availability of legal services.
67. United Transportation Union v. Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
68. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
of group legal practice would be that the attorneys retained would
soon become familiar with the types of problems encountered by
the group, with the result being development of the ability to han-
dle a greater number of problems in a routine manner. 0 Other
measures to increase efficiency, and thus decrease cost, without ad-
versely effecting the quality of the services have been suggested.
Use of trained laymen under the control and supervision of the
attorney to handle routine matters would save valuable lawyer
time.7 0 Management of the law office7' is another area where in-
creased efficiency could be passed on to people of moderate means
in the form of lower costs. Increased use of specialization also
has potential to increase efficiency and decrease cost,72 with the ad-
ditional benefit of making qualified specialists available to middle
income people in contests with large institutions which now re-
tain "a battery of experienced, well-financed specialists."7 3
Another way in which group legal services can reduce the cost
of legal services to the individual is through the insurance princi-
ple of spreading the risk of legal catastrophe over the members of
the group. This is the primary benefit of the ABA sponsored pre-
paid legal plans, and it appears that costs of legal services to the
individual have been effectively reduced under the Shreveport plan
without the necessity of substantially relying on available founda-
tion funds.7 4 It should be noted, however, that reliance on the in-
surance principle without alteration of the basic fee structure will
actually result in higher total costs of services because of the
expense of administering the plan.75
The group legal device also has potential to educate middle in-
come people to recognize legal problems. Educational programs
addressed to the group by its retained attorneys would go far to-
ward apprising group members of the existence and extent of legal
remedies. Social intercourse among group members would accom-
plish much the same purpose. The selection problem would also
be alleviated in the group context because the attorneys would be
selected by the group in a rational manner. And, in view of the
fact that selection of a lawyer presently appears to be a major
obstacle to utilization of legal services and generally is an irrational
69. CmusTENsEN, supra note 18, at 45.
70. Id. at 46-53.
71. ABA PRocEEDINGs OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW OFFICE ECO-
NOMICS AND MANAGEMENT (1967).
72. CmusTENsEN, supra note 18, at 82-127.
73. Id. at 101.
74. Revised Handbook, supra note 25 at 267.
75. ABA TRANscRuT OF PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID
LEGAL SERvIcEs, 129 (1972).
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and random process, no serious objection can be raised to this
method of selection.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been recognized that middle income people are denied
meaningful access to the legal system because of high cost of le-
gal services, ignorance of legal rights and remedies, and the diffi-
culty of finding a lawyer. It has also been urged that group legal
services offer a means of alleviating these obstacles and of provid-
ing access to the system. In view of the ABA's recognition of a pro-
fessional duty to make legal services available,7 6 the following cri-
teria for the regulation of group legal services are suggested.
Lawyers should be permitted to cooperate with any organized
group that wishes to offer group legal services to its members. Ef-
forts to restrict the types of groups which may offer legal serv-
ices to its members to those specifically required by constitutional
interpretations77 should be abandoned as inconsistent with the
broad sweep of Canon 2.78
The scope of permissible legal services should include all legal
problems of individual members, limited only by the traditional
conflict of interest considerations.79 A more restrictive regulation
would seriously curtail the educational advantages of group legal
services and deprive members of the group of needed information
and benefits.
Advertising the availability of legal services to group members
and soliciting their use thereof must be permitted if maximum utili-
zation of the services is to be realized. Educational programs ad-
vising members of legal rights and remedies are also necessary to
full utilization of the system, and presentation of such programs by
the retained attorneys should be allowed.
Although no instance of either group interference with the inde-
pendence of the attorney's judgment or dilution of the attorney-
76. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBInTY, CANON 2.
77. Id., DR 2-103 (D).
78. See Stolz, Sesame Street For Lawyers: A Dramatic Rendition of
United Transportation Union v. The State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576
(1971), 36 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS No. 2 (1971).
79. DR2-103 (D) (5) (b) currently limits such services to those incidental
to the primary purpose of the organization.
client relationship has been found, 0 and it would appear that pres-
ent regulations seeking to preserve these values are sufficient in
the group context, it is recommended that the requirement of DR2-
103 (D) that the independence of the attorney be preserved, should
be retained for purposes of emphasis.
Finally, it is recommended that some method of peer evaluation
and review be established over group practitioners. Programs
should be registered with a regulatory authority, whose functions
would include: monitoring advertising and solicitation activities
to ensure against fraud and overreaching; ensuring that the at-
torney-client relationship is adequately preserved; and acting as an
arbitration board to resolve possible disputes between the attorney,
the group, and the individual client.8 '
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80. But see United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401
U.S. 576, 598 (1971) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
81. CAL. Bus. & Por. CODE § 6076, RuLE 20 (West 1954), would seem to
incorporate these criteria while rejecting the more rigid restrictions of
DR2-103 (D).
